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Abstract 
Freedom of religion and the manifestation of religious belief can clash with working life in 
a number of ways, including time away from work for religious observance, conflicts over 
religious clothing and jewellery in an employer’s dress code or a request for a variation of 
duties based on a particular religious belief. Guidance issued by the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission following Eweida and others v. UK [2013] 57 EHRR 8 seems to suggest 
that employers in Great Britain should consider the ‘reasonable accommodation’ of 
religion in the workplace and, in particular, how an individual chooses to manifest that 
religious belief. Subsequently, there has been much debate about whether this is a better 
way of dealing with religious discrimination cases than the current complex legal 
framework of direct and indirect discrimination in the Equality Act 2010. Section 20 of 
the Equality Act 2010 already allows for reasonable adjustments to be made to working 
practices and the physical working environment for disabled employees. Should this duty 
be expanded to include religion and what would be the consequences and impact of such 
an accommodation or adjustment on the employment relationship? 
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  Introduction 
The Equality Act 2010 brings all ‘protected characteristics’1 together into one piece of 
legislation, all separate ‘silos’ (Solanke, 2011) but in theory equal before the law, no one 
more important than the other. However, some protected characteristics which may have 
an impact on one’s ability to do a particular job at particular times, such as pregnancy, 
age or disability are subject to special rules. Other protected characteristics, such as sex, 
race, sexual orientation and religion or belief, have less impact on one’s ability to do a 
particular job and should largely be ignored by an employer unless that employer is 
seeking to rely on a particular work requirement having regard to the nature of the work.
2 
Nevertheless, the issues that have arisen from well-publicized religious discrimination 
cases
3 
demonstrate that, although the private religious belief per se does not necessarily 
affect the ability of a person to do a job, the manifestation of religion may impact on the 
way in which, or the extent to which, that person is prepared to carry out their employ- 
ment contractual duties. 
The law on religion or belief is relatively recent and, as suggested by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) Research report on religion or belief, the law in this 
area ‘addresses complex issues in a context where there is considerable difference of 
opinion as to how the law should be framed and applied’ (Edge and Vickers, 2015: 3). It 
is fair to say that much has been written in the United Kingdom about religious discrim- 
ination in the workplace in the last 5 years. The debate is gathering pace and one aspect 
ripe for further consideration is the extent to which the personal freedoms surrounding 
religious beliefs and the manifestation of those beliefs should be recognized in the public 
space of work, particularly when those religious beliefs conflict with the employer’s 
desire to run an efficient, profitable business or with the personal freedoms of other 
employees and customers/service users. 
This article will re-examine whether religion too should be subject to special rules, 
either through a duty of reasonable accommodation or adjustment,
4 
or as suggested in the 
EHRC Research report, a separate right to request an accommodation similar to the right 
to request flexible working (Edge and Vickers, 2015: 50–57). This article will examine 
whether a positive duty of reasonable accommodation of (or ‘reasonable adjustment’ for) 
religion could have a constructive impact on cases of religious discrimination in the 
workplace and whether this might be preferable to the current negative duty of ‘do not 
discriminate’ which can pitch one protected characteristic against another. In examining 
the potential impact of reasonable accommodation of religion on the employment rela- 
tionship, this article will scrutinize arguments for and against the reasonable accommo- 
dation principle and will also consider what employers should take into account when 
assessing whether an accommodation is beneficial and, most importantly, ‘reasonable’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Religion as a ‘protected characteristic’ and the current 
legal framework 
Religious beliefs held in private are often invisible in the public domain of work and 
usually have no bearing on a person’s capacity to work. However, some religious 
employees live their lives, including their working life, through their religion and this 
can manifest itself in a variety of ways. Some manifestations, particularly of minority 
religions in Great Britain, are more obvious in the public space of work because of the 
requirements of a particular way of dressing, such as the wearing of a hijab or niqab, a 
Sikh turban or a Jewish Kippah, or a particular way of thinking which can conflict with 
work requirements, the structure of the working day or contractual duties. Finkin (2002) 
argues that when we enter the workplace and interact with others, we must contract away 
some of our privacy and autonomy. Nonetheless, he goes on to suggest that if we give up 
so much of ourselves that we cease to be persons, then it must fall to the law to decide 
what is ‘alienable and what is not’ (Finkin, 2002: 633). This idea of contracting away our 
privacy and autonomy at work was brought to the forefront of the debate in the well- 
publicized decision in Eweida and others v. UK [2013] 57 EHRR 8 (Eweida and others), 
which brought the domestic legislative framework on religion or belief into question and 
highlighted how difficult it is for some employees to give up so much of themselves and 
their religious convictions when they enter the workplace. The decision in Eweida and 
others also drew attention to a more explicit notion of reasonable accommodation of 
religious beliefs in the workplace. The EHRC Research report on religion or belief 
published in October 2015 (Edge and Vickers, 2015) takes forward the EHRC’s religion 
or belief strategy and reports, among other things, on the balancing of rights and explores 
the concept of the reasonable accommodation of religion in the workplace and the law as 
it currently stands. With this context in mind, the equality law on religion or belief and 
the duty of adjustments in a work context will be explored in detail below. 
Religion is protected both within domestic law and at a European level as a matter of 
equality law and human rights law. This article will concentrate on the application of 
equality law through the Equality Act 2010 as it applies to England and Wales.
5 
Prior to 
the Equality Act 2010 religion was protected by the Employment Equality (Religion and 
Belief) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1660) to comply with Directive 2000/78/EC, which 
established a framework for equal treatment in employment (the Employment Equality 
Directive). The Equality Act 2010 now provides the framework for legal protection by 
means of direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimization. Religion is 
one of the nine protected characteristics in section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 and is 
further defined in section 10 as meaning any religion or lack of religion. Belief (or lack 
thereof) is also protected alongside religion and applies to any religious or philosophical 
belief. The definition of religion and belief is identified in the EHRC Research report as 
warranting further assessment, but that is outside the scope of this article (Edge and 
Vickers, 2015: 12–21). 
The Human Rights Act 1998 is also relevant to claims of religious discrimination as it 
gives further effect to the protections given by Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in the context of domestic legislation. The right to internal 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion cannot be restricted, but external freedom 
 
 
 
to manifest one’s religion or belief can be subject to limitations which are necessary to 
protect, among other things, the rights and freedom of others (Articles 9(1) and 9(2) 
ECHR). 
Under section 13 Equality Act 2010, direct religious discrimination occurs when an 
employer treats an employee less favourably than it treats or would treat others because 
of a protected characteristic, such as religion. The comparator model for direct discrim- 
ination involves individuals in the same or similar circumstances as the claimant and, 
other than the occupational requirement exception,
6 
there is no defence to such claims. 
Most cases on the manifestation of religious belief in England and Wales involve indirect 
discrimination under section 19 Equality Act 2010. Indirect discrimination occurs when 
a neutral provision, criterion or practice has a disproportionate impact on a relevant 
group defined by a protected characteristic, religion in our case. The comparator model 
in indirect discrimination therefore involves groups rather than individuals (Khaitan, 
2015). It is intrinsic to the concept of indirect discrimination that there is a protected 
group that has been put to a particular disadvantage. If an employee successfully proves a 
disadvantage on account of membership of that group, an employer can go on and defend 
cases of indirect discrimination by stating that the provision, criterion or practice is a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Indirect discrimination is a complex 
concept and the problems are exacerbated by the variety of ways in which it might apply 
to religious employees. The difficulties of pursuing direct and indirect religious discrim- 
ination claims will be explored in more detail below within the context of recent case 
law. Claims of harassment and victimization because of religion are not relevant to this 
particular discussion and will not be examined further. 
The duty to make reasonable adjustments was first introduced in England and Wales 
by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. The duty is now found in sections 20–22 of 
the Equality Act 2010, which harmonized the previous provisions. In the context of 
employment, the duty of reasonable adjustments involves the employer taking any 
reasonable step, or combination of steps, necessary to remove a disadvantage experi- 
enced by the disabled person which, if taken, would enable the disabled person to work. 
The duty comprises three requirements, the first requirement in section 20(3) being the 
one most appropriate for cases of religious discrimination: A duty arises when a provi- 
sion, criterion or practice of the employer puts a disabled employee at a substantial 
disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not 
disabled, and the employer is required to take such steps as are reasonable to have to take 
to avoid the disadvantage. Section 21 goes on to state that a failure to comply with that 
duty is an act of discrimination against the disabled employee. The intention of a 
reasonable adjustment is for the employer to respond sensitively to the needs of the 
individual employee on a case-by-case basis and remove barriers which are preventing 
that disabled employee from participating in the workplace. As disability is multifaceted, 
the duty of reasonable adjustment too encompasses a range of responses. 
When assessing the reasonableness or otherwise of the adjustment in question, it is 
clear that it is an objective assessment and chapter 6 of the Employment Statutory Code 
of Practice on the Equality Act 2010 sets out factors that should be considered and 
particular steps that would be effective in preventing the substantial disadvantage caused 
by a provision, criterion or practice (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011). 
 
 
 
The relevant factors include the practicability of the step; the financial and other costs of 
making the adjustment and the extent of any disruption caused; the extent of the employ- 
er’s financial or other resources; the availability to the employer of financial or other 
assistance to help make an adjustment and the type and size of the employer. The duty 
can encompass a wide variety of adjustments.
7
 
When examining the current legislative framework, it is clear that in its basic form, 
anti-discrimination law in England and Wales is designed to facilitate notions of formal 
equality. The focus of direct and indirect discrimination is on comparable treatment (or 
comparable impact) or disparate treatment (or disparate impact) of individuals in the 
same or broadly similar situation. However, anti-discrimination law can often fail to treat 
people as individuals (Eidelson, 2013). It groups people together according to their sex, 
race, religion, sexual orientation and so on. It is largely negative in design: do not 
discriminate; ‘do not take account of my sex, age, race, sexual orientation, disability 
or religion when making a decision about me in the workplace’. Focusing on equality of 
treatment therefore forces employers to ignore the individual’s personal characteristics. 
Collins (2003) argues for three kinds of deviation from the formal equal treatment 
principle. First, different treatment is required when treating like with like would almost 
certainly result in unfairness, such as in cases of pregnancy or disability. Secondly, equal 
treatment might also result in unjustifiable indirect discrimination. In such cases, equal 
treatment would disadvantage disproportionately a protected group and that cannot be 
objectively justified. Thirdly, positive discrimination is sometimes required to rectify 
historical inequalities. The focus of formal equality is ‘like treatment’, but if disadvan- 
tage results from like treatment, then what should be treated as relevant? For religious 
individuals in the workplace, while the religion per se should be subject to like treatment 
or notions of formal equality, the particular manifestation of a religious belief may 
benefit from different treatment to enable religious individuals, particularly those of 
minority religions in Great Britain, to participate fully in the labour market. For example, 
an employer directly discriminating against Muslims in the workplace can be tackled 
using formal equality principles, but a female Muslim who wants to wear a niqab in the 
workplace may require an individualized accommodation of a particular dress code if 
she is to fully participate in the labour market. However, this is somewhat controversial 
given that the accommodation of a manifestation of a religion or belief may itself impact 
on the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
 
The public sphere of work and religion: The case law 
 
Case law has demonstrated the controversial nature of particular, sometimes highly 
individualized, manifestations of certain religions by religious individuals in the context 
of working for non-religious employers and has demonstrated that these manifestations 
can clash with the requirements of the employer and may even discriminate against other 
employees or service users. Most cases involving manifestations of religious belief in the 
workplace occur because of the application of a dress code or uniform policy, time off to 
observe religious holidays or acts of worship, proselytization by a religious employee, or 
opting out of work duties for religious reasons. A number of commentators have written 
about the reasonable accommodation of religion or belief in the last few years. To name a 
 
 
 
few: Gibson (2013) has considered recent case law using models of religious reasonable 
accommodation drawing from Canadian jurisprudence; Wintemute (2014) has proposed 
accommodating religious beliefs from a human rights perspective and the RELIGARE 
project examined reasonable accommodation in six European countries (Bader et al., 
2013). However, the issues have not been addressed from the point of view of domestic 
reasonable adjustments. There is some scepticism as to whether or not using the domestic 
disability model of reasonable adjustment would be appropriate. This was highlighted 
during workshops in the context of the EHRC Research report on religion or belief (Edge 
and Vickers, 2015: 72–74 and 76–78). This section of the article will attempt to consider 
this viewpoint and examine recent case law from the standpoint of disability reasonable 
adjustments, while reflecting on the situation of religious reasonable accommodation 
more generally. 
Azmi (Azmi v. Kirklees Metropolitain Borough Council [2007] IRLR 484) raises the 
complex issue of religious clothing at work. Azmi was a teaching assistant who was 
ultimately dismissed by her employer because she refused to remove her niqab while at 
work. The case gave rise to claims of direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and 
victimization. For our purposes, the interesting points are raised in the direct and indirect 
discrimination claims. The direct discrimination claim was dismissed by both the 
Employment Tribunal (ET) and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT). There was 
much debate about the correct comparator for the direct discrimination claim, but it was 
agreed that the comparator was another person not of the Muslim faith who had a face 
covering. It was decided that because the comparator would also have been asked to 
remove the face covering when teaching the children, there was no direct discrimination. 
There was, however, indirect discrimination in this case as the requirement to wear 
clothing that does not cover the face or a considerable part of the face and which 
interferes with the employee’s ability to communicate properly with the children was 
a neutral provision, but women of the Muslim faith who choose to wear a niqab would be 
disadvantaged and Azmi had herself been disadvantaged. Yet, the employer was justified 
in their requirements because of the support needed for the particular children taught by 
Azmi. 
The proportionality requirements in the justification defence for indirect discrimina- 
tion do in theory address issues of reasonable accommodation, but for Azmi, there is the 
possibility that a specific request to accommodate the niqab or a duty of reasonable 
adjustment could have made a difference to the outcome of the case, as it is not clear why 
some of the alternative suggestions for accommodation were refused during the consid- 
eration of the employer’s justification defence ([2007] IRLR 484: paras 73 and 74). As 
Azmi was providing assistance rather than taking the full class as a teacher, she could 
have been screened with her target group away from the rest of the class when working 
with a male teacher or the target group could have been removed to a separate room 
where Azmi could have removed her veil when speaking directly with the children who 
required her specific support. It is agreed, however, that this possibility does depend if 
such a room was available and whether or not this would result in unreasonable disrup- 
tion for the children, but this is not clear from the decision. Allowing the niqab to be 
worn in the classroom with a screen when Azmi was working with male teachers would 
have removed the disadvantage as perceived by Azmi, because she would have remained 
 
 
 
in employment and the economic cost for the employer would be fairly minimal. Time- 
tabling Azmi to work with only women would be more problematic and using additional 
hand gestures may not have overcome the lack of visual direction required to effectively 
communicate with the children. The argument heard in the ET and EAT about whether 
wearing the veil itself was a belief and therefore requires protection from direct discrim- 
ination was dismissed entirely but arguably requires greater scrutiny (Pitt, 2013). Not all 
Muslim women wear the niqab, but many do and in this particular situation they would 
be entirely excluded from that particular workplace and others like it. 
We need to be careful not to suggest that the decision in Azmi means every similar 
case would result in the same conclusion, as the work context will be crucial. While a 
teaching assistant who can remove her target group from the classroom so her face can be 
uncovered to allow appropriate interaction with the children might be allowed to wear 
the niqab more generally in the classroom and around the school, a classroom teacher 
taking a class with a male teaching assistant would potentially struggle to interact 
appropriately with the pupils if her face was covered throughout the day. However, a 
right to request an accommodation or a duty of reasonable adjustment in this particular 
scenario may have enabled a more open dialogue about the issues and resolution at the 
workplace level (Edge and Vickers, 2015: 53). There may still have been litigation as to 
the meaning and extent of reasonableness, but some of the alternatives in this case were 
arguably reasonable. 
Eweida (Ewedia v. British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80) is less problematic 
from a reasonable adjustment or reasonable accommodation point of view. If Nadia 
Eweida had had a right to request an accommodation for her religious jewellery in the 
workplace or British Airways had had a duty to consider a reasonable adjustment of 
allowing her to wear her religious jewellery when redrafting the uniform policy, then this 
case may well have been resolved amicably in the workplace and there would have been 
none of the highly charged publicity on the issues in the media. When examining the 
reasonable adjustment duty, the employer of course could have argued that Eweida had 
not suffered a ‘substantial disadvantage’ in comparison to non-religious individuals 
because of the uniform policy. As substantial means more than ‘minor or trivial’8 the 
threshold is relatively low, and as this was a deeply held religious conviction by Eweida, 
she could arguably have crossed that threshold. Allowing the necklace as part of the 
uniform policy would have removed the disadvantage, it was a relatively easy, practical 
step to take, the cost was negligible and the policy could be (and subsequently was) 
easily modified to allow a discrete necklace to be worn. 
Nevertheless, this case does highlight one of the difficulties with the current legal 
framework for indirect religious discrimination claims. A particular manifestation of a 
religion can be singular in nature: not all Christians believe, for example, that wearing a 
cross is a key component of their religious belief. Under the current legal framework, 
such cases will always fail because group disadvantage cannot be demonstrated (Pitt, 
2011). At the Court of Appeal (CA) stage, Eweida’s claim did indeed fail because she 
could not point to a group of religious individuals who felt similarly disadvantaged by 
her employer’s uniform policy. Eweida had always worn this particular necklace with a 
cross, but prior to the change in uniform policy, this had been hidden; it only became an 
issue once the cross became visible after the change in uniform policy. Due to her desire 
 
 
 
to wear this particular necklace, she was herself disadvantaged by the uniform policy, but 
the CA concluded this was a solitary disadvantage. British Airways had offered to 
accommodate Eweida by moving her to a post where there would be no public contact 
and therefore no formal uniform requirement, but this was not acceptable to Eweida and 
would of course have hidden the religious symbol away. There did not seem to be any 
legitimate reason why British Airways could not accommodate the jewellery other than 
the argued for ‘corporate image’. Although there was some discussion in the case about 
justification, it did not matter as there was a finding of no indirect discrimination due to 
the perceived solitary nature of Eweida’s personal jewellery preference. A duty of 
reasonable adjustment or right to request a reasonable accommodation would have 
allowed for this solitary disadvantage to be rectified without the need to demonstrate 
group disadvantage. 
Shirley Chaplin, a nurse (Chaplin v. Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital NHS Founda- 
tion Trust [2010] ET 1702886/2009), was moved to a desk job after refusing to remove 
her crucifix, which she had worn for 30 years at the time of the ET ruling in 2010. Like 
Nadia Eweida, Chaplin could not demonstrate group disadvantage but, importantly, the 
employer argued that they were justified in their uniform policy on the grounds of health 
and safety, and the ET held that this was entirely reasonable given the work context. If 
Chaplin had had a right to request an accommodation of her particular manifestation of 
her Christianity, then it is likely that the outcome would have been the same. There are 
important differences between Chaplin and Eweida, as argued by Wintemute (2014), and 
the work context is crucial in the assessment of reasonableness (Wintemute, 2014: 237– 
240). The National Health Service Trust had asked other religious individuals to adapt 
their religious clothing because of the perceived health and safety risk to patients, while 
British Airways had adapted their uniform policy to accommodate other religious cloth- 
ing. It is important, however, that a tribunal continues to scrutinize the health and safety 
justification defence to ensure that it is not exaggerated by employers. On the issue of 
religious clothing and religious symbols more generally, Wintemute argues ‘that public 
sector employees who wear religious clothing or symbols to work (as in the UK, Canada 
or the USA) are doing nothing more than making their cultural differences visible, and 
giving their workplace the same visible diversity as the street or public transport’ (Win- 
temute, 2014: 235). He goes on to say that, in accommodating religious dress, the 
employer is not ‘endorsing’ the religion in the workplace. This observation could also 
be applied to the private sector employer. 
It is ostensibly easier to make a claim of religious indirect discrimination if one can 
demonstrate that a particular way of dressing or a particular way of thinking is required 
by the religion rather than a mere individual preference. The issue of core beliefs was 
highlighted in the case of Mba (Mba v. Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of 
Merton [2013] EWCA Civ 1562). The majority of British workplaces are constructed 
around the Christian calendar, observing Christian holidays such as Easter and Christ- 
mas, and Sunday being the traditional day of rest. Some workplaces, however, do require 
Sunday working. In Mba, a sincerely held belief that Sunday is a day of worship and not 
for work brought an employee into conflict with her employer as to her required working 
hours. The relevant provision, criterion or practice in the indirect discrimination claim 
was the requirement that staff work Sunday shifts as rostered. Having accepted the 
 
 
 
employer’s aim to provide comprehensive care to those in its care home as legitimate, 
the ET then had to balance the discriminatory impact of the provision on the employee 
and ascertain whether it was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim. The 
claim of indirect discrimination was rejected by the ET, and appeals to the EAT and the 
CA were subsequently dismissed. The CA ([2013] EWCA Civ 1562), in rejecting Mrs 
Mba’s appeal, highlighted the issue of the diversity of beliefs within one faith. Not all 
Christians will be Sabbatarians. Some will work Sundays, some will not, and the appeal 
centred on this diversity of beliefs and whether or not something had to be a core 
component of a particular faith for it to be protected. The decision again also raises the 
problem of group disadvantage required for claims of indirect discrimination as opposed 
to an individual or solitary preference for the manifestation of a religious belief. Rather 
than excluding Sabbatarians from such workplaces, an employer could consider making 
an accommodation for such beliefs when working time is rostered. 
Perhaps the most controversial issue in the debate about the accommodation of 
religious beliefs in the workplace involves the refusal to serve same-sex couples high- 
lighted in case law. Due to their particular interpretation of Christianity, both Lillian 
Ladele and Gary McFarlane held the view that same-sex partnerships were contrary to 
God’s law. The CA in both Ladele (Ladele v. London Borough of Islington [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1357) and McFarlane (McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 
880) dismissed appeals against EAT decisions that the employers had not discriminated 
against these individuals on the basis of their religious beliefs. Ladele was employed by 
the London Borough of Islington as a registrar of births, deaths and marriages, and her 
refusal to register the civil partnerships of same-sex couples under the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004 eventually led to her dismissal. McFarlane was required to provide counselling 
services for same-sex couples and was eventually dismissed for stating that he would 
comply with Relate’s policies on counselling same-sex couples without any intention of 
doing so. 
Employees such as Ladele and McFarlane are entitled to believe, however offensive 
that view may be to some that, in accordance with their particular interpretation of 
Christianity, same-sex relationships are wrong. Accommodating the views of such indi- 
viduals in the workplace is problematic given the potential for direct discrimination 
against others because of their sexual orientation. Accommodating the stance taken by 
Ladele and McFarlane would eventually lead to them refusing to serve same-sex couples 
in direct contravention of their contractual requirements and equality law. Once Islington 
Borough Council decided to appoint all of their registrars as Civil Partnership registrars, 
any accommodation of Ladele’s religious beliefs would lead to direct discrimination 
against same-sex couples, as she would undoubtedly have refused to officiate on such an 
occasion. Arguably McFarlane put himself in harm’s way as, once he decided to train as 
a psychosexual counsellor, he must have known that he would be conflicted over coun- 
selling same-sex couples. An accommodation may have been a practical step to take and 
at relatively little financial cost to the employer. Any substantial disadvantage caused to 
Ladele or McFarlane by their contractual requirements would have been removed if they 
had been allowed either not to officiate at civil partnership ceremonies in Ladele’s case, 
or be excluded from counselling same-sex couples in McFarlane’s case, but this would 
be unreasonable as the employer would then be facilitating direct discrimination because 
 
 
 
of sexual orientation against others. By fulfilling their contractual requirements, neither 
Ladele nor McFarlane were actually endorsing same-sex relationships and a compromise 
on their part should arguably have been reached. 
Again, both Ladele and McFarlane highlight the fact that religious belief is multi- 
faceted and its interpretation is arguably subjective, that religious practice can be very 
individual and may cause harm to others. Sedley LJ in Eweida highlighted the fact that 
all the other protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010 are objective character- 
istics of individuals, but that religion and belief are subjective and entirely matters of 
choice ([2010] EWCA Civ 80 para. 40). Religious individuals would probably disagree 
with that assessment, but it is fair to say that how one decides to manifest one’s particular 
religious beliefs is subjective and highly individualized and should not necessarily be 
accommodated by employers where to do so would cause direct discrimination against 
others. 
Despite the various debates in the academic literature and the case law, there is, of 
course, no specific duty of reasonable adjustments or reasonable accommodation avail- 
able for cases of religious discrimination in Great Britain and nor is one being proposed. 
The issue, however, is not going away and a number of commentators have suggested 
that a duty of reasonable accommodation may well improve the law on religious dis- 
crimination (Alidadi, 2012; Gibson, 2013). The recent EHRC Research report also 
covers the issue of reasonable accommodation (Edge and Vickers, 2015: 50–56) in some 
depth. Having reviewed the current legal framework and the relevant case law, argu- 
ments for and against such a duty will now be reviewed. 
 
 
 
Should religion be ‘reasonably accommodated’ and what would 
reasonable mean? 
A duty of reasonable accommodation may provide a more workable solution for cases of 
religious discrimination than indirect discrimination. The threshold requirement of group 
disadvantage for indirect discrimination and the complexities of proportionality required 
for the justification defence can be problematic for cases of religious discrimination. The 
need for group disadvantage in claims of indirect discrimination has been called into 
question by the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida and others by dissenting 
Judges Bratza and Thor Bjorgvinsson ([2013] 57 EHRR 8 para. 9) and the majority 
([2013] 57 EHRR 8 para. 82), but the issue was not resolved in this case and there is no 
suggestion that the law on indirect discrimination will be changed. 
Introducing a more general duty of reasonable accommodation was suggested by the 
Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-discrimination Legislation (Hepple 
et al., 2000), and although the issue formed part of the consultation on the single Equality 
Bill, the government made it clear in their response to the consultation that the duty of 
reasonable adjustments would not be extended to other protected characteristics.
9 
Others 
have since commented that it would have been beneficial to consider whether disadvan- 
tages experienced by individuals with other protected characteristics, such as religion, 
could be tackled by a reasonable adjustment which would allow the employer a flexi- 
bility of response to the religious individual (Lawson, 2011: 369). Khaitan also suggests 
 
 
 
that ‘there is no logical reason why reasonable accommodation should be limited to 
disability alone’ (2015: 76–77). 
In February 2014, the European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-discrimination 
Field
10 
published a thematic report recognizing that, although the United States and 
Canada do have a duty of reasonable accommodation beyond disability, the European 
Union has so far only developed this concept in relation to disabled individuals in the 
field of employment (Bribosia and Rorive, 2014).
11 
In the United States, the duty is to 
accommodate religion unless to do so causes ‘undue hardship’: arguments related to 
economic cost, inconvenience and even complaints from other workers have been suc- 
cessful in invoking undue hardship (Vickers, 2008: 222). The steps considered in cases 
of religious reasonable accommodation in Canada also include cost, morale problems, as 
well as the size of the employer, health and safety and so on.
12 
Gibson argues that 
adopting a Canadian model of reasonable accommodation would help ‘facilitate better 
judicial engagement with individual interests as balanced with competing factors’ and 
would enable religious individuals to feel less alienated by the law (Gibson, 2013: 616). 
Although the outcome in the case law would remain largely unchanged, Gibson does 
suggest Ladele may have been decided differently, but only really by allowing Ladele to 
discriminate against others ‘behind the scenes’ (Gibson, 2013: 606–607). 
The duty of reasonable adjustments as applied to disabled individuals in domestic law 
is not without issue. The duty in employment is entirely reactive rather than anticipatory, 
responding to specific situations when disabled employees present themselves as ready 
and willing to work (Lawson, 2008). It is also limited in scope as the duty only arises 
when triggered by knowledge of the disability (Vickers, 2008: 221). This has the benefit 
of an individualized approach to disability discrimination, but it fails to tackle the kind of 
barriers that discourage participation of disabled people more generally. Indirect dis- 
crimination is used to tackle systemic, structural barriers to full participation but fails to 
tackle individual disadvantage. Prior to the introduction of indirect disability discrimi- 
nation in the Equality Act 2010, there was a general failure to recognize how employees 
with disabilities as a group were marginalized by structural barriers in the workplace and 
attitudes within society (Lawson, 2011: 376). While unfortunately there is no anticipa- 
tory duty of adjustment for disabled employees,
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the introduction of an anticipatory 
duty for religious individuals could potentially tackle structural and systemic religious 
discrimination, as an employer would have to anticipate aspects of his or her business 
that discriminate against particular manifestations of religious belief more generally 
(Lawson, 2011: 368–369) while also providing a much needed individualized approach 
where appropriate for those employees disadvantaged by the current framework of 
formal equality. 
The manifestation of religious belief is potentially more like disability than sex or 
race are, because of the multifaceted nature of religious belief which, as we have seen, 
can often be interpreted by an individual believer in a variety of ways. Whether one 
believes that one should dress modestly in public or whether one believes Sunday must 
be a day of rest and is therefore wholly relevant to working hours, religious belief is 
complex and the requirements of indirect discrimination do not allow for a particular 
nuanced or individualized approach to the manifestation of religious belief. Disability is 
similarly multifaceted and complex and the requirement of group disadvantage for 
 
 
 
indirect disability discrimination claims would similarly disadvantage disabled employ- 
ees, as it is generally not easy to point to a group of disabled employees who are similarly 
disadvantaged by an employer’s provision, criterion or practice. Disability requires a 
more nuanced approach and indirect discrimination alone would not wholly protect the 
disabled individual in the workplace. For disabled employees, treating disabled and non- 
disabled in the same way, without an individualized approach to the potential constraints 
of the person’s disability in the workplace, would perpetuate disadvantage and, there- 
fore, a reasonable accommodation of the disability allows for an individual disadvantage 
to be acknowledged and rectified. It embraces notions of substantive equality rather than 
formal equality, facilitating inevitable differences that exist between disabled individu- 
als or groups of disabled individuals and sees beyond identical treatment which can 
result in inequality. This flexibility of response by the employer would be advantageous 
for religious individuals, whose particular manifestation of religious belief may also 
require a more individualized approach. 
This flexibility of response, however, may lead to other problems, as the current 
protection for disabled employees is asymmetrical in nature, hence only disabled (not 
able-bodied) individuals being able to bring claims of disability discrimination. An 
employer can therefore treat disabled employees more advantageously than other 
employees who do not have a disability
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and no corresponding claim can be brought 
by the disadvantaged able-bodied employee. For religion the protection is symmetrical 
in nature as the provisions protect religious individuals and non-religious individuals. 
So, if we take the situation in Mba, if a reasonable adjustment were made to Mrs Mba’s 
workload so she did not have to work Sundays and a non-Sabbatarian or non-religious 
colleague were given extra work to cover Mba’s Sunday work, that colleague could 
potentially bring a claim for direct discrimination if there was less favourable treatment 
because of his or her lack of religion. Vickers (2008: 222) also advances the argument 
that accommodation of individual religious beliefs could provide too much protection for 
religious interests. This may then disadvantage other employees who have to pick up the 
workload of the religious employee who is being accommodated by changing a working 
pattern. 
The media portrayal of religious discrimination claims does nothing to advance the 
debate.
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Religion is often portrayed as competing with other equality strands or is seen 
as exposing what is sometimes referred to as an ‘emerging hierarchy’ between protected 
characteristics in the Equality Act 2010, where the rights of religious individuals clash 
with the rights of others (Vickers, 2010). This perceived ‘hierarchy’ may be more likely 
to emerge if a duty of reasonable accommodation of religion were introduced, as certain 
adjustments may lead to other, more direct discrimination. Pitt (2013), for example, 
argues against reasonable accommodation of religion if to do so would privilege religion 
over other protected characteristics or facilitate individuals to hold discriminatory views 
on sex, race or sexual orientation. 
Gibson, however, argues that, where there is a conflict between equality strands, 
religion and sexual orientation for example, ‘one interest may inevitably trump another 
in the proportionality balance’ of indirect discrimination, and he goes on to suggest that 
reasonable accommodation provides a more ‘transparent framework than indirect dis- 
crimination in which to understand when and why such subordination occurs’ (Gibson, 
 
 
 
2013: 589). Nonetheless, a positive accommodation of workplace diversity, including 
religion, enables the employer to balance the many competing characteristics of its 
workers without individuals giving up too much of themselves, while fulfilling the 
requirements of their employment contract. The law can then be used to focus on 
disadvantage and exclusion and promote social inclusion, rather than alienation from 
mainstream society (Collins, 2003), which is particularly important where the religion is 
a minority religion in Great Britain. Similarly, an individualized approach to religious 
diversity in the workplace is suggested by Wintemute’s proposal for a ‘workable test for 
assessing justification’, based on a liberal harm analysis which allows a middle path of 
accommodation where manifesting a belief causes no harm to others, and involves 
minimal cost, disruption or inconvenience (Wintemute, 2014: 223–253). 
What is often missing from debates about reasonable accommodation of religious 
belief is how employers would assess reasonableness in practical terms and how it could 
best be achieved. Similar steps to the ones set out in Chapter 6 of the Employment Code 
of Practice on reasonable adjustments for disabled employees could be used. As has been 
done above, tribunals could assess the reasonableness threshold as it relates to the 
particular manifestation in question, balancing whether the accommodation would 
remove the disadvantage experienced by the religious employee against factors such 
as cost, health and safety considerations, the interchangeability of the workforce, the 
nature of the job, the extent of the responsibilities aligned to the job, and how easily they 
can be undertaken by someone else. In cases of religious discrimination, the ‘reason- 
ableness’ threshold would also have to include an assessment of the impact of the 
accommodation on others, both from a direct discrimination point of view and also in 
terms of workload, so that the non/other-religious individual does not feel 
disadvantaged. 
When applying these factors to the case law discussed above, it is clear that the 
introduction of a duty of reasonable adjustment for religion, or a right to request a 
reasonable accommodation for a particular manifestation of religious belief, may just 
be a symbolic gesture, as having examined the case law using these factors it is unlikely 
that there would be any great difference in outcome for individuals such as Chaplin, 
Ladele, McFarlane or Mba. In relation to cases involving uniform policies or dress codes, 
the outcome may be slightly different for individuals such as Eweida or Azmi, but not 
necessarily for all potential claimants, as the work context would be highly relevant. 
Recent research by the EHRC also suggested that there was a broad consensus by the 
research participants that a reasonable accommodation should be made on the basis of a 
person’s religion or belief where there is no conflict with the equally protected rights of 
others (Donald, 2012). Although a specific legal duty of reasonable accommodation was 
not proposed to these research participants, there was a presumption in favour of the 
accommodation of religion, even if the operation of an accommodation was acknowl- 
edged as very fact-specific.
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In any case, the manifestation of religious belief in the workplace, like disability or 
pregnancy, may benefit from the introduction of special rules, even if those rules are 
largely symbolic. Perhaps, as suggested by the EHRC Research report on religion or 
belief, the introduction of a separate request for a reasonable accommodation of religion, 
especially if it relates to clothing, religious symbols or time off for religious observance, 
 
 
 
may advance the debate on religion in the workplace (Edge and Vickers, 2015). The 
arguments for reasonable accommodation in this EHRC Research report are compelling 
and they include the creation of a clear structure for requesting an accommodation for 
religious individuals which could lead to disputes being resolved in the workplace rather 
than the ET; a more open dialogue about religion or belief in the workplace, which would 
potentially lead to greater satisfaction with the place of religion within the legal frame- 
work; and, importantly, such a duty would be available for the protection of individual 
beliefs as well as for groups of religious individuals more generally, therefore eliminat- 
ing one of the recurring problems in claims of religious indirect discrimination (Edge and 
Vickers, 2015: 50–56). 
Allowing employees to manifest their religious belief as long as no harm is done to 
others could improve employee well-being, improve a company’s public image and help 
with the recruitment and retention of staff. If the particular manifestation of a religion is 
very visible, such as the wearing of the hijab or religious jewellery, then accommodation 
of that religious dress on an individual basis would allow for increased participation and 
economic advancement of those from certain minority religions, thus also enabling 
social inclusion (Collins, 2003). 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This article has examined whether a duty of, or a right to request, reasonable accom- 
modation is a better way of advancing equality for religious individuals in the workplace 
than the current framework of indirect discrimination. It has done this by assessing recent 
case law against the domestic duty of reasonable adjustments, suggesting that religious 
belief, like disability, is multifaceted and complex, and indirect discrimination alone 
does not always address the difficulties faced by religious individuals in the workplace. 
A more individual and nuanced approach to the needs of religious employees is arguably 
a better way of achieving substantive equality and harmonizing some of the perceived 
conflicts that may exist between protected characteristics, most notably religion and 
sexual orientation. 
It is submitted that the benefits of a duty of reasonable accommodation to businesses 
and their employees outweigh the arguments against providing more protection for 
religious individuals. Moreover, such a duty would potentially facilitate better legal 
adjudication than the complexities of indirect discrimination claims. 
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Notes 
1. Section 4 Equality Act 2010: the following characteristics are protected characteristics – age; 
disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; 
race; religion or belief; sex and sexual orientation. 
2. Schedule 9 Equality Act 2010. 
3. For example, see Ladele v. London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357, Ewedia v. 
British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80, McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd. [2010] EWCA Civ 
880. 
4. ‘Adjustment’ is specifically used in the context of disability discrimination protection in the 
Equality Act 2010, but is used interchangeably within this article with ‘accommodation’ 
which is often used more specifically in the context of religion. For the purposes of this 
article, both expressions will mean the same thing. 
5. The Equality Act 2010 also covers Scotland, with the exception of section 190 and Part 15. 
Religion and belief in Northern Ireland is covered in separate legislation. 
6. Schedule 9 Equality Act 2010. 
7 For example, in Archibald v. Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32, the normal requirements for a 
competitive interview were waived. 
8. Section 212(1) Equality Act 2010. 
9. The Equality Bill – Government Response to the Consultation, Cm 7454, 2008: 60–65. 
10. Now replaced by the European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non- 
Discrimination. 
11. Article 5 of the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC. 
12. Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission) [1990] 2 SCR 489. 
13. There is an anticipatory duty of adjustment for disabled persons in Schedule 2 of the Equality 
Act 2010 for the provision of services and public functions and other non-employment areas 
(except housing). 
14. Archibald v. Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32. 
15. Bingham J (2004), ‘Christian Beliefs should be ‘accommodated’ under law’. The Telegraph, 
London, 20 March 2014. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10712546/ 
Christian-beliefs-should-be-accommodated-under-law-top-judge.html 
16. It should be emphasized that the sample in Equality and Human Rights Commission Research 
report 84 was small (only 47 respondents and 70% of those respondents were from the public 
sector, with 90% of the respondents being large organizations) and therefore not necessarily 
truly representative of England and Wales as a whole. 
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